History 28/02/20 for any errors of Hitler’s Germany lost the Second world
on 4 February 1938, Hitler ousted from their posts of Minister of war von Blomberg and the chief of the General staff of the army von Fritsch. Now the main instrument of foreign policy of the Reich was in the hands of the Fuhrer. In the coming war that Hitler to the rank of Supreme commander was to win the laurels of the winner.
But real change in the psychology of Hitler occurred after the outbreak of the Second world war, when Germany less than a year captured virtually all of Western Europe. “It became more and more overwhelm a crazy idea to be a commander, who thanks to his infallible intuition can do the same thing that the highly qualified generals and staff,” wrote Hitler, the German historian Hans-Adolf Jacobsen.
the Superiority of the German military machine seemed to have clouded the mind of Hitler. He was openly expressing distrust of professionals, who until recently was his indisputable authority. American historian Bevin Alexander writes about this: “Hitler didn’t understand that the victory of the Germans managed to win not because of his insight, but thanks to the leadership skills of the two generals Erich von Manstein and Heinz Guderian”.
When on the Western front was the turning point and superiority of the allies in the air became obvious, Hitler and did not want to hear about defensive strategy. Already in 1943, American planes were unhindered bombing of German cities and close to the aviation industry.
According to the remark of the German commanders, “fighting the fighters of the Imperial defense could not compensate for the mistakes of its senior management that were made in the area of absenteeism planning.” The arbitrariness of Hitler sooner or later would lead to fatal consequences.
On two fronts
9 Jan 1941 at a secret meeting at the headquarters of the operational management of the Wehrmacht, Hitler had justified their plans for the invasion of the Soviet Union: “the British supported the hope for the possibility of Russian intervention. Only then will they abandon resistance, but this will be defeated when their last continental hope.”
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen in his work “How was lost the Second world war” argues that “Lebensraum in the East” pervaded the political calculations of Hitler, the main impetus was the “Napoleonic idea to break England defeating Russia.” At first glance, a crazy idea had its paradoxical logic.
Immigrated to England by the German journalist Sebastian Haffner explained that, at least, two years Germany had little to fear of a major offensive in the West. If Hitler was able during this period to subjugate the Soviet Union and force its population and industrial potential to work in Germany, then he could hope that in 1943 or 1944, will be ready for the final fight with England and America.
In the case of the conquest of the Soviet Union, Hitler hoped to entice Japan to war with the British colonies in the Asian region, which significantly increased the chances of the axis of the overall success in the war.
As expected, the decision to “proceed with the destruction of the vital forces of Russia” is concerned by a number of German generals. They feared to leave behind him a potential threat in the face of Britain and the United States.
Paradoxical logic of Hitler once again displayed itself after a fracture on the Eastern front, when the meaning of the military campaign of the Reich was only a postponement of defeat. Now the Fuhrer, it seemed, wanted the war in the West. “The active intervention of England and the United States in the European theater of operations gave Germany a chance to replace the lose in the East defeat the West, or even cause a big war between East and West as a continuation of the war with the Soviet Union”, thought Haffner.
the Chain of mistakes of the German headquarters started in June 1940and when the commander of army group “A” Gerd von Rundstedt with the filing of Hitler stopped making their way to the English channel, the Panzer divisions of the Wehrmacht. Fateful stop order gave the allies the opportunity to evacuate the British Isles more than 350,000 soldiers – almost everyone who was in the boiler at Dunkirk.
In April 1941 field Marshal Erwin Rommel was on the verge of a great victory: his Afrika Korps were fixed at positions in the vicinity of the Suez canal and was ready to push out the British troops. All that was necessary for the conquest of Egypt, is the strengthening of group of Rommel’s rapid redeployment of two Panzer divisions.
the Commander of the German Navy Erich Raeder heard about the successes of the Wehrmacht in North Africa, Hitler offered to take “decisive offensive Egypt – Suez”. In his opinion, if Rommel received reinforcements they required, he certainly would have occupied Egypt long before the end of 1941.
the intent of Rommel, it was necessary to suspend the offensive in the Balkans and concentrate forces in North Africa, finally to expel the allies from the Mediterranean basin. In refusing the transfer of additional divisions in Egypt Rommel was accused of the chief of staff of the land forces Franz Halder, not knowing that General only obediently fulfilled the will of the Fuhrer.
Hitler took advantage of the gift of Rommel. He continued to dream of a big war in the East.
22 August 1941, General Heinz Guderian received an unexpected order to move his army to Kiev. The next day Franz Halder announced Hitler’s decision to postpone the Leningrad and Moscow operations to focus on the capture of the Ukraine and Crimea.
Guderian meeting with Hitler, expressed his position on the immediate offensive on Leningrad and Moscow, the fall of which allowed them to bring ultimate success in the war. Hitler in response vehemently accused his commanders of incompetence and strongly insisted on the need for pickupATA important industrial area in the South-East of Ukraine.
Ukraine Pala – Hitler attained his goal. In late autumn the German army stepped up its actions in the Moscow area. However, the Soviet leadership used the temporary respite to prepare for the defence of the capital.
Grand Admiral Erich Raeder once told Hitler that the defeat of France has opened a path to total victory, and to conquer the whole world does not need to attack the Soviet Union. However, an experienced naval commander realized that to convince the Chancellor was impossible.
Even to join the war against the Soviet Union, Hitler could not concentrate on a single decisive goal. Bevin Alexander in his book “10 fatal mistakes of Hitler,” wrote that the German leader sought to win three at the same time located at a great distance from each other of the object: Leningrad, because there the communism was born, Ukraine – the breadbasket of the Soviet Union and the Caucasus, a critical oil-rich region.
From October 1941, German troops first encountered serious difficulties in supply, because the bandwidth of the Soviet Railways was lower than expected. Normal transport was complicated by regular guerrilla raids, and the onset of autumn thaw several times reduced the rate of advance of army group “Center”.
“soon the Roads turned into bottomless mud channels – recalled Guderian, – in which our machine can move at a snail’s pace, badly fraying the motors”. The arrival of the harsh Russian winter and the red Army counteroffensive and completely paralyzed the German war machine.
the Situation on the Eastern front, Germany showed the highest demands on logistics and troop support. Hitler was distraught. Quick victories of the German army in the West has gone to his head. Head of land forces General Affairs Friedrich Albert in 1941 soberly noted: “Our army is only a breath of wind in the wide Russian steppes”.
the German writer Ernst Engelberg utveridae that the collapse of the blitzkrieg is largely associated with the arrogant attitude of the Chancellor towards the Soviet Union. “It played a role in military production in the years 1940-1942 was not brought to the scale, as it took place after 1942,” concluded the author.
“the Arrogance of the winner” — as a military historian Rolf-Dieter müller described the shortcomings of the German military industry on the eve of operation “Barbarossa”. The head of the German war economy Hans Karl lamented the fact that the economic potential of the occupied industrial areas of Europe were not used in the proper way: “the War was lost economically in 1940-1941”.
in the Spring of 1943 Germany was in a critical situation on the Eastern front. Many German generals realized that only defensive actions can save the army from disaster. March 9, 1943, while supporting the German military leaders, Hitler asked Mussolini not to take offensive action on the Eastern front. Hitler refused to ally, and then Duce in a rage threatened to conclude a separate peace with the Soviet Union.
By the summer a significant part of the German front in the Soviet Union, in the words of field Marshal Manstein, “like he was asking to be hacked off”. But Hitler made the same mistake at Stalingrad. “He was going to attack the fortress and used all the advantages of mobile tactics when faced with a Russian in the place which they chose themselves,” – criticized the Fuhrer Manstein.
At Kursk, the Wehrmacht lost the tank capacity (about 1500 cars), which is further expected Guderian. Without armor, the German army not only could not successfully attack, but to defend themselves. July 10, 1943, on the Sicilian shore landed Anglo-American troops, which adds a headache to the German General staff.
If, before the defeat at Kursk, Hitler still hoped for a separate peace with Stalin, now the Soviet leader dictated terms. Now the red military machine would to move forward to the West.
in 1943, the epicenter of military confrontation with the earth moved in the sky. There is clearly began to shape the advantage of the allies. Germany continued to fight types of aircraft, the radius of which does not exceed 500 kilometers. Only by the end of 1943 in the sky appeared a four-engine bomber “He-177”. But while the start of serial production of new machines, the allies systematically destroyed the German fuel reserves.
Germany also lacked fighters. Hitler was only in late 1943 ordered to bring their production up to 300 cars per month. But the capacity of the fleet was not enough. Historian Hans-Adolf Jacobsen observes that the highest German leadership adhered to the principle to defend the airspace, mainly on the outer bastions, while the German sky remained vulnerable to allied aircraft.
However, Germany had guns, the likes of which the world was not a jet aircraft Messerschmitt Me.262. In 1943, the aircraft was at the stage of improvements. Hitler in the modified car wanted to see not only a fighter but a bomber. The leadership of the Luftwaffe the idea of a universal plane recognized the extreme bad. The Chancellor, of course, continued to insist on.
Differences in the military leadership led to the opening of the Second front high speed bomber was not ready. Procrastination has cost Germany’s total defeat in the air war.
a German lawyer of the Third Reich, Hans Frank noted that “the Empire founded on democratic principles, exist until the end of time, and the Empire founded on the principles of hatred and physical violence, always have a rather short period of existence”. As has repeatedly drawn the attention of historians, the Nazi ideology pushed by Germany’s potential allies, initially met the German troops as liberators.
After the failure in the “Battle of Britain”, according to writer Alexander Bevin, Hitler remained the two most important tasks: “the war against Soviet Russia and the physical elimination of objectionable representatives of the Nazi peoples. This attracts the attention of Hitler, but also taken most of the military and human resources of the German Reich”.
a Historian at the University of the Bundeswehr in Hamburg Bernd Wegner in addition to the strategic factors that led to the defeat of Germany, calls the ideological – “tabooization of defeat.” This suicidal ideology “ruled on all system levels of the state in General and army in particular”. Wegner concludes that because of shifting a large part of the war, Germany was forced to lead into improvisational mode.
the Obsession with Hitler at any cost to bring the war to a victorious triumph was “infected” and many German generals. Colonel-General Alfred Jodl despite the retreat of the German army stated that Germany would win, “because we must win, because otherwise world history would have lost its meaning.”
Admiral Doenitz noted an inexplicable hypnotic “radiation” coming from Hitler. After visiting the führer Dönitz took a few days to recover. The demonic influence of Hitler on the environment in terms of the critical situation at the front will inevitably move the Empire to a catastrophe which could no longer stop even the most sober of the Reich.
© Russian Seven
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