The battle of Stalingrad: the most famous misconceptions

History 21/03/20 the battle of Stalingrad: the most famous misconceptions

Speaking about the battle of Stalingrad, which became a turning point in the great Patriotic war, a time to recall some of the conventional judgments of this battle and compare them with the known facts. The reliability and validity of these judgments, as we will see, will be different.

First: at Stalingrad, the German army suffered the biggest defeat in its history.

This is true only in relation to those battles of the Second world war, which took place before Stalingrad, the battles of the First world war and the wars of the nineteenth century except the Napoleonic. According to German General K. Tippelskirch, at Stalingrad “there is something incomprehensible, not experienced since 1806 – death surrounded by the enemy army.” In 1806 in the battles of Jena and Auerstadt the Prussian army was completely destroyed by the French army of Napoleon. Before the disaster at Stalingrad the Germans never experienced anything like it. But after Stalingrad are even more a major defeat of the German troops ceased to be the exception.
Second, at Stalingrad, the Soviet army held the largest in the history of the world wars on, surrounded by enemy troops.

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This is not true, as to Stalingrad, the Germans have repeatedly carried out a successful operation on the environment and the destruction of much larger groups of Soviet troops. In the first week of the great Patriotic war near Minsk in the environment were the troops of the two armies of the Soviet Western front, and among the prisoners the Germans took more than 300 thousand people. In the autumn of 1941 in the course of operations first at Kiev, then Vyazma and Bryansk Germans each time managed to capture more than 650 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers. The total number of surrounded at Stalingrad grouping of German, Romanian and Croatian troops were, according to contemporary estimates, 280 thousand people.

a Thirde: Hitler wanted at all costs to take Stalingrad because of its name.

the plans of the German command in 1942 priority was to capture the Caucasus. After the fighting in early July it was found possible to take Stalingrad by the same 6th army and redirected the 4th Panzer army in the Caucasus direction. Only at the end of August 1942 it moved it again on the Stalingrad direction. The desire to capture Stalingrad, on the background of the failed offensive in the Caucasus, Hitler justified the fact that the Volga is supposed to be the main way of transportation of Caucasian oil. However, many military leaders of the Wehrmacht after the war, explained the tenacity of Hitler in the capture of this city that is the magic of his name. Before the start of the Soviet offensive, many of them offered to advance Hitler to withdraw from Stalingrad at the turn of the lower don, to which he agreed.

Fourth: the Germans in the attack on Stalingrad is much superior to the Soviet troops in the amount of effort and funds.

unfortunately, in the summer of 1942, the Soviet command is not always and not everywhere have learned from the defeats of last year and gave the enemy the ability to use the material. Before the battle in the great bend of the don at the end of July 1942, against 270 thousand officers and soldiers of the German 6th army were 300 thousand soldiers of the 62nd and 64th Soviet armies, against 3400 enemy guns and mortars – 5000 Soviet, German tanks against 400 – 1000 Soviet.
on 26 July, Stalin and the chief of the General staff A. M. Vasilevsky sent a telegram: the command of the Stalingrad front with an expression of indignation his actions: “At the front the advantage in tanks three times, the absolute predominance in aviation [it was the truth – J. B.]. At desire and ability it was possible to shatter the enemy.” Meanwhile, during his poorly executed counterattack, the troops of the front for the first three days lost 450 tanks, almost half their number.

the Fifth: Stalingrad was a major direction in the winter campaign of 1942/43 G.

the bulk of both Soviet and German troops by the winter of 1942/43, was concentrated, as shown by the data on their number in the Central direction, to the West of Moscow. And the main operation of the red army in the winter campaign was planned there – Rzhev and Vyazma. However, it has failed. At Stalingrad Soviet troops failed to make a strategic breakthrough of the enemy front. This led to a shift in the focus of future operations to the South.

Sixth: there was no point in stubborn defense of Stalingrad; Soviet troops only suffered there a large, unjustified losses.

By November, 1942 the fully destroyed Stalingrad was not an economically important facility. But it was located on an important strategic position. Full mastery of it would allow the Germans to withdraw from Stalingrad to the rear of a large mass of troops. In this case, Stalingrad would not have been able to play the role of a strategic trap for the German army and the Soviet troops would not have been able to gain underneath such a significant victory. In addition, the German occupation of Stalingrad, the infamous their propaganda all over the world, no doubt, greatly raised their morale and at the same time, would reduce that of the Soviet troops and of the people. The magic of the name of the city played a role in not only Nazi, but also for the Soviet leadership. But Napoleon brought such a formula, that in war the moral factor is correlated with material in the proportion of three to one.
Seventh: in the event of capture by the Germans of Stalingrad, Japan and Turkey would have entered the war against the Soviet Union.

Although there were no clear plans or commitments of Japan and/or Turkey to start a war against the Soviet Union in this case, the factor such a possibility was taken into account by the Soviet leadership, and no doubt played some role in the determination to defend Stalingrad to the last.

Eighth: the Germans had to withdraw from encirclement by the army of Paulus and save her from death, but for unknown reasons did not.

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When in the middle of December 1942 tank group of General Hoth crossed two-thirds of the distance that separated her from surrounded at Stalingrad 6th army, Paulus had only to break a bone. The views of the memoirists and historians why the order for a breakthrough has not been given, differ. Some blame the indecision of Paulus, the other – the commander of army group “don” field Marshal Manstein, and others – Hitler. Some have argued that Hitler forbade Paulus to breakout and specially sacrificed the 6th army to create a symbol of heroic resistance (it is unclear, then, why he organized the deblocking kick).

most Likely, the Germans waited, when the troops of Gotha will come to the encircled units closer to be sure. But the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops (the episode of the war described in the famous novel by Y. Bondarev “Hot snow”) has upset these calculations. As a result, as it turned out, the most favorable moment for the counter breakthrough by the Germans was irrevocably lost.

Yaroslav Butakov

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© Russian Seven

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